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Abstract 
The Arab Spring events and the fall of several dictatorships have 
created a new reality in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA 
region) leading to expectations of change in the European Union (EU) 
approach towards security policies in its southern neighbours. To what 
extent has Tunisia become an integrated part of the EU security 
community? In seeking to answer this question, this paper argues that 
the degree of integration with the EU security community depends on 
two conditions: the level of integration and the level of relative 
attractiveness of the EU. A high level of integration with the EU would 
mean that the scope of the agreements is relatively extensive and that 
there is a certain degree of adaptation to EU rules as well as 
participation in EU policies. The EU, as a liberal integrative actor, 
works together with the domestic environment in the partner country, 
as well as the potential competition from other regional actors, to 
shape its relations with MENA and East European neighbouring 
countries. 
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 1. Introduction 
For decades, the European Union has been trying to guarantee the 
security of its borders and the stability of its neighbours. However, with 
the events of the Arab Spring, security and stability goals have seemed 
to be collapsing, due to chaos on its southern borders (Egypt, Libya and 
Syria), illegal migration and security threat on the rise, and Islamists 
winning the first free and fair elections in several countries. The latter 
was of great concern for the EU especially in Egypt until the military 
coup of 3 July 2013 that toppled the Muslim Brotherhood-elected 
president and government. This fear, that Islamists may attain power 
through free and fair elections, is nothing new in the Western world. 
Memories of the sweeping victory of Islamists (Front Islamique du 
Salut) in Algeria’s 1991 parliamentary elections – that ended with 
military coup and civil war – still raise fear among the EU countries. 
The Palestinian elections of Hamas in 20061 and Hizbollah in Lebanon 
in the last two decades are recent examples of the threats that could 
emerge with such groups in power. This situation creates a dilemma for 
the EU: how to cope with the issue of supporting democracy while not 
accepting its results? 
The lack of democratic changes in the region was highlighted in the 
2011 review of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) (European 
Commission 2011a). The main reason for this ineffectiveness is widely 
seen as being the EU’s quest for security and serving as security 
provider in the region – given the cooperation of the authoritarian 
regimes in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). Despite the 
importance of economic and trade relations since the Barcelona 
process, agreements with the EU have essentially focused on security 
and stability, at the expense of democracy (Pace 2010; Dennison and 
Dworkin 2011). 
With the Arab Spring events and the fall of several dictatorships, a 
new reality was created that leads to expect a change in the EU 
approach towards policies in its southern neighbours. To what extent 
has Tunisia become an integrated part of the EU security community? 
In seeking to answer this question, this paper follows the argument put 
forward by Rieker (2014) and holds that the degree of integration with 
the EU security community depends on two conditions: the level of 
integration, and the level of relative attractiveness of the EU. The EU, as 
                                                          
1  In the case of Hamas, the EU and other Western powers refused to deal with Hamas 
and did not accept the results of the elections that were held by the same players to 
be ‘free and fair’.  
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a liberal integrative actor, works together with the domestic 
environment in partner countries, as well as the potential competition 
from other regional actors, in shaping its relations with MENA and the 
East European neighbouring countries.   
 2. Analytical framework – the EU 
as a liberal rational player 
The ‘civilian power’ approach developed by Duchêne (1973) during the 
economic crises of the 1970s rests on the idea that the EU is ‘a civilian 
group long on economic power and relatively short on armed forces’ 
(Duchêne 1973: 19). The main difference from the realist approach is 
that it focuses on other means of influence than military power (see 
Twitchett 1976). The European Union’s influence in the world has 
always rested on economic and diplomatic means. Hill highlighted how 
Western European behaviour based on ‘diplomatic rather than coercive 
instruments, the centrality of mediation in conflict resolution, the 
importance of economic solutions to political problems, and the need 
for indigenous peoples to determine their own fate’ (Hill 1983: 200).  
The civilian power concept continued to be the focus of discussion 
during the 1980s and was developed further in the 1990s. Maull 
defined civilian power in terms of three dimensions: ‘a) the acceptance 
of the necessity of cooperation with others in the pursuit of 
international objectives; b) the concentration on non-military, 
primarily economic, means to secure national goals, with military 
power left as a residual instrument serving essentially to safeguard 
other means of international interaction; and c) a willingness to 
develop supranational structures to address critical issues of 
international management’ (Maull 1990: 92–93). An actor is 
considered to be a civilian actor when it ‘uses civilian means for 
persuasion, to pursue civilian ends, and whose foreign policy-making 
process is subject to democratic control or public scrutiny’ (Smith 
2005: 68-69). 
The EU tries to persuade other players to comply and agree by 
providing a set of economic incentives. The EU’s civilian power ‘does 
not lie in the deployment of battalions or bombers, but rather in the 
quiet promotion of democracy and development through trade, foreign 
aid and peacekeeping’ (Moravcsik 2002). This lack of military power is 
what makes the EU a unique, attractive and influential international 
actor in the world (see Feldman 1998). The EU is seen as a ‘magnet for 
surrounding states’ (Ginsberg 1999: 446). It has the largest share of 
world GDP – 25.8 per cent in 2010, compared to 22.9 per cent for the 
USA (Eurostat 2013). The EU is among the world’s largest trading blocs 
and is a highly influential player in the World Trade Organization. Its 
market is one of the most successful and attractive markets in the 
world, which ‘creates a nearly irresistible impetus to political and 
economic reforms’ (Moravcsik 2002). States either do whatever it takes 
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to join the European Union or sign a partnership or association 
agreement. This attractiveness makes the EU an influential civilian 
player, permitting or denying its membership or its market, or 
conditioning the access to its market on certain rules and norms that 
third countries must implement (Smith and Woolcock 1999: 451).  
The EU is the major provider of development aid in the world, and is 
also heavily represented in peacekeeping missions. In many instances 
we see some division of labour here between international actors. 
While the military aspect is taken care of by NATO or other states such 
as the USA, the peacebuilding missions and postwar aid and missions 
are ensured by other actors including the EU: ‘America can bomb 
aggressors with impunity. But when the shooting stops, only the 
Europeans can play the superpower in keeping the peace, 
reconstructing the economy and promoting democracy’ (Moravcsik 
2002). However, the effectiveness of EU policies is heavily dependent 
on the cooperation of the elites in the targeted country, a favourable 
domestic environment that makes the possibility of complying with EU 
rules high, and how attractiveness the incentives are. As we shall see, 
cooperation between the EU and Tunisia has been based on rational 
attitudes that led to the creation of an EU security community. 
 
 3. Decades of cooperation: EU–
Tunisia relations 
3.1 Background 
Tunisia has long been considered an important ally and partner of the 
EU. The Tunisian population and its elites hold values and beliefs that 
are very close to those held in the EU (interviews with Tunisian 
politicians and civil society leaders, October 2013). Tunisia’s relations 
with the EU date back to March 1969, when a cooperation agreement 
(mainly trade-based) was signed between the European Economic 
Community (ECC) and Tunisia. This agreement was followed by a new 
one, under the umbrella of the Overall Mediterranean Policy,2 in 1976. 
Similar agreements were signed between the EEC and two other 
Maghreb countries, Algeria and Morocco. The 1976 agreement 
deepened economic relations between the EEC and the Maghreb 
countries by including economic and financial assistance. The 
agreement with Tunisia (25 April 1976) aimed at developing the 
country’s socio-economic situation ‘through trade, economic, technical 
and financial cooperation and cooperation in the social field’ 
(European Commission3 1982: 2). 
As the term for the 1976 agreement was for five years, it was 
renewed twice, in 1981 and in 1986. The renewal was accompanied 
with a net increase in the European Commission’s grants and loans 
share of the protocols. Then, in view of institutional changes at the EEC 
level with the move towards Maastricht Treaty and the accompanying 
developments, the Global Mediterranean Policy (GMP) was replaced by 
the Renovated Mediterranean Policy. In 1992, a new set of agreements 
was negotiated within the RMP framework for the 1992–1996 period. 
‘The main two innovations of the RMP consisted in prioritizing 
economic and structural reforms in the Beneficiary countries and the 
accent on the regional cooperation and on environment’ (MEDEA 2013, 
online edition). 
                                                          
2  In 1972, the heads of the nine EEC members-states established the ‘overall 
Mediterranean policy’ in which they sought to create a futuristic view for 
developing their relations with the Mediterranean countries. This would allow the 
EEC members to ‘establish the essential points of the agreements to be concluded 
or renewed with the countries concerned. Within this framework, increased 
importance was given to the question of financial and technical cooperation with 
the Maghreb countries’ (European Commission, 1982: 1).  
3  For coherence, I use ‘European Commission’ throughout the entire text instead of 
switching between the ‘Commission of the European Communities’ and the 
‘European Commission’. 
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With the launch of the Euro–Mediterranean Partnership, established 
in Barcelona in November 1995, Tunisia became the first 
Mediterranean country to sign an Association Agreement (AA) with the 
EU, on 17 July 1995. This Agreement, which constitutes the legal basis 
for EU–Tunisia relations, entered into force on 1 March 1998. As we 
will see, the AA includes most of the points covered by EU agreements 
with candidates countries. It covers many areas, ranging from political 
and security partnership, to a financial and economic partnership and 
a social, cultural and human partnership. The AA set 1 January 2008 as 
the date for putting in place a free trade area for industrial products. It 
‘also established permanent working structures for political and 
sectoral dialogue’ (European Commission 2011b). With the birth of the 
ENP, EU–Tunisia relations ‘have been developed in the framework of 
the European Neighbourhood Policy, on the basis of an EU–Tunisia 
Action Plan, adopted in 2005 for 5 years’ (European Commission 
2011b). 
Following the fall of the regime of Ben Ali,4 a steady process of 
democratization and institution building was initiated that led to the 
first open and fair elections of a Constituent Assembly on 23 October 
2011, followed by the drafting of a new constitution based on 
democratic principles, which has been approved by the National 
Constituent Assembly. The domestic environment in the Arab Spring 
countries favours democratic reforms, and particularly in Tunisia. 
Although EU membership is not part of the ‘package’, Tunisia is 
interested in other incentives offered by the EU, like agricultural 
liberalization, visa facilitation to increase mobility, and greater 
economic cooperation eventually leading to participation in the Single 
Market. Moreover, the EU is still the most trusted international actor in 
the region generally, not least in Tunisia – which gives the EU stronger 
influence. As mentioned, the Tunisian population and its elites hold 
values and beliefs that are very close to those held in the EU (interviews 
with Tunisian officials and civil society activists, October 2013). 
The agreement between the EU and Tunisia on a Privileged 
Partnership (PP) and the signing of a new Action Plan on 19 November 
2012 show the common values and beliefs with the EU, as well as the 
attractiveness of the EU in Tunisia. The new agreement focuses on a 
range of areas that will support economic development and democratic 
transition. The EU has ‘reiterated its offer to gradually integrate Tunisia 
into the European internal market, to re-launch negotiations on 
liberalising trade in agriculture, to make rapid progress in the aviation 
discussions and to improve the mobility of EU citizens and Tunisians 
                                                          
4  President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali was the second president of Tunisia from 
November 1987 until he was forced by Tunisian protesters to flee to Saudi Arabia 
on 14 January 2011.  
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through the conclusion of a mobility partnership’ (EU Council 19 
November 2012). 
3.2  The Dignity Revolution in Tunisia: new challenges to 
the EU 
Since the mid-1980s, the Tunisian regime has survived by using socio-
economic development tools, with the aid of Western countries and 
international organizations such as the IMF and the World Bank, to 
support the agricultural industry and tourism, increase its exports, 
create jobs, and achieve stable growth rates. This economic prosperity 
helped the regime to survive despite the popular discontent with 
oppression and lack of freedoms. However, economic stability could 
not last long, given the increasing unemployment (around 17 per cent 
in 2012) – especially among the young educated and skilled Tunisians 
who account for over 30 per cent of the unemployment rate (The 
Economist 19 March 2013), growing inflation and poor living 
conditions.  
The economy barely survived the repercussions of the global 
financial crisis of 2008, but could not escape the negative effects of the 
euro crisis – mainly in the banking sector, due to the drop in liquidity, 
which affected lending ability. Following a meeting of the Board of 
Directors of the Central Bank of Tunisia on 16 November 2011, a 
statement was issued showing the country’s deteriorating economic 
situation (Tunisia-live 2011); exports were declining as Tunisia’s main 
trading partners were the EU countries, economic growth was slowing 
down, foreign and domestic investments were falling short of targets. 
Further, the number of tourists was declining (the majority of tourists 
come from EU countries), causing a significant drop in the revenues 
from tourism and limiting the number of people benefiting from the 
tourism sector. The deteriorating economic situation increased the 
public debt, the budgetary deficit and inflation. 
The inability of the Ben Ali regime to continue to use socio-economic 
tools to secure the stability of its rule, as it had done before, together 
with the decades of oppression and lack of basic freedoms, created 
suitable conditions for an explosion. The actual protests were triggered 
by the self-immolation of Mohammed Bou-Azizi on 17 December 2010, 
after his vegetable cart had been confiscated and he had been harassed 
and humiliated by a police officer in Sidi Bouzid. This symbolic act led 
peaceful marchers to gather in the place where Bou-Azizi had set 
himself on fire. The brutal response of the police and army led to 
nationwide protests, supported by labour unions and some parts of the 
elite such as lawyers. It did not take long before the will of Tunisians 
prevailed, and Ben Ali was toppled.  
The fall of the regime paved the way for free and fair elections, held 
on 23 October 201 and won by the En-Nahda Party, which formed a 
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coalition with the centre–left Congress for the Republic and the left 
party Et-Takatol. Despite the successful elections, the road towards 
democracy building and economic recovery have proved long and 
difficult.  Let us now turn to the question: how does this new reality 
affect the scope of the agreement, level of participation and adaptation 
to the EU rules and criteria? 
 
 4. Scope of the agreement with the 
EU 
The strong partnership and the long-term relationship between the 
EEC/EU and Tunisia have been characterized by high consistency. The 
Association Agreement (AA) signed within the Barcelona process 
framework, along with the Neighbourhood Action Plan and the PP, 
embraces various political, economic, security and cultural fields. The 
AA covers wide range of areas divided into the following categories: 
political dialogue; free movement of goods; rights of establishment and 
services; payments, capital competition and other economic 
provisions; economic cooperation; cooperation in social and cultural 
matters; financial cooperation; and institutional, general and final 
provisions.  
Examining the EU enlargement process with candidate countries 
and comparing it to the AAs and the ENP action plans, we see very 
much the same focus and comprehensiveness in the areas covered, 
with almost identical areas for cooperation and reforms. However, the 
major components of the AA and Action Plan with Tunisia (as in the 
case of other ENP countries) are the clauses dealing with security 
matters and those providing for the creation of an EU–Tunisia free 
trade area by the year 2010 – not yet achieved, due to various delays 
and the outbreak of the Dignity Revolution in Tunisia. In comparison to 
the acquis chapters, the AA has more details on justice and home 
affairs, with special focus on issues related to migration, border 
security and the fight against organized crime5 (see Table 1 in the 
Appendix). 
The customs union (chapter 29 in the acquis chapters), which 
includes legislation binding on all member-states, is not included in 
the AA. Also what are missing in the AA with Tunisia in comparison to 
the acquis chapters are matters regarding fisheries, trans-European 
networks (chapter 21, which focuses on compliance with certain 
measures in transport, telecommunications and energy infrastructure, 
for adherence to European standards), financial control (chapter 32) 
and financial, budgetary provisions (chapter 33) and institutions 
(chapter 34, which relates to EU institutions and representation in 
                                                          
5  Migration (legal and illegal, re-admission, visas, asylum); border management; 
combating organized crime (including the smuggling of migrants and trafficking of 
human beings); drugs; money laundering, economic and financial crimes; judicial 
and police cooperation 
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them). Two areas that were added in the AA but missing from the 
acquis chapters are civil society and cultural cooperation (see 
Appendix).  
Moreover, the major difference, aside from what was mentioned 
above – i.e. the prospects of membership and meeting certain macro-
economic convergence criteria – is that the EU’s agreements with its 
southern neighbours are based on bilateral negotiations in which the 
target country has a greater say in what it needs, and the policies and 
reforms it is willing to implement. This focus on cooperation in relation 
to national priorities is also reflected in the correspondence between 
the EU and the target country, in which the programmes included in 
national development plans and the needs of the national economy are 
clearly taken into consideration. At meetings of the Association 
Council, Tunisian ministers voice their demands and have a larger say 
in what figures on the meeting agenda. A main reason why the MENA 
countries have been granted a greater say is the importance of ensuring 
that their regimes will cooperate with the EU on security-related 
matters. This has pushed the EU to display a ‘soft’ attitude with the 
MENA, in comparison to the ENP countries in the east. 
 
 5. Adaptation to EU rules and 
norms 
The level of adaptation to EU rules and norms, and complying with the 
EU values, has been more advanced in certain areas than in others. As 
mentioned, cooperation in the field of security (justice and home 
affairs, regional policies, regional cooperation in common security 
threats and issues, etc.) has been highly advanced. Under Ben Ali, 
Tunisia succeeded in complying with EU rules and could benefit from 
EU support to develop its security sectors – especially with respect to 
border control, anti-terrorism and efforts to counter illegal migration.  
Economic cooperation was also quite advanced, despite unbalanced 
support and selectivity on the part of the EU as well as the Tunisian 
authorities regarding which fields needed to be developed. This lack of 
vision regarding the economy resulted in economic development being 
concentrated to the major cities, while the peripheral regions were 
ignored. This has put more pressure on measures to counter illegal 
migration, since most   illegal migrants try to escape from these 
marginalized regions to the EU in their quest for a better life (interviews 
with senior Tunisian officials, October 2013). Moreover, although the 
EU supported Tunisia’s economic reforms and development, 
decentralization development plans were not dealt with.  
5.1 Democratic reforms  
Neither the EU nor other Western actors have been successful in 
pushing MENA regimes to reform the areas of freedoms, human rights, 
civil liberties and corruption. Focusing more on stability and security, 
the EU failed to exert real pressure to get targeted regimes to fight 
corruption, or implement significant institutional and administrative 
reforms such as accountability, transparency and judiciary reforms. 
This stabilized the authoritarian regimes that maintained an iron grip 
on all political, economic and judicial aspects. The Western powers’ 
fear of changes that might have uncertain consequences led them to 
support those regimes, even at the expense of democratic reforms. As 
regards freedoms and human rights, Tunisia always ranked very low 
and as ‘not free’ (except for 1997) until the Dignity Revolution broke 
out in 2010 (see Table 1). 
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Table 1 Tunisia: Freedom House Ratings 
 
Year Political Rights Civil Liberties Status 
1995 6 5 Not Free 
1996 6 5 Not Free 
1997 6 5 Partly Free 
1998 6 5 Not Free 
1999 6 5 Not Free 
2000 6 5 Not Free 
2001 6 5 Not Free 
2002 6 5 Not Free 
2003 6 5 Not Free 
2004 6 5 Not Free 
2005 6 5 Not Free 
2006 6 5 Not Free 
2007 7 5 Not Free 
2008 7 5 Not Free 
2009 7 5 Not Free 
2010 7 5 Not Free 
2011 3 4 Partly Free 
 
Source: Freedom House (2013) 
*the scale ranges from 1 for ‘Free’, to 7 for ‘Not Free’ 
 
Despite the increase of support to institutional and political reforms, 
the post-Arab Spring era has brought some minor changes in EU 
attitudes regarding Tunisia. The EU focus is still on the justice and 
home affairs areas that deal with security and stability (interviews with 
various Tunisian officials, October 2013). However, in Tunisia, unlike 
the pre-Arab Spring period, supporting democratic reforms now would 
lead to more stability in the long term and better cooperation with the 
new regime. Supporting democratic reforms goes hand in hand with 
stability in Tunisia that will guarantee better cooperation regarding 
security. Moreover, there is increased assistance to civil society, which 
shows a shift from the EU focus on the top–down approach to bottom–
up approach regarding the promotion of democracy.  
Regarding justice, rule of law and freedom of expression and 
association as well as the terms of openness to civil society, dialogue 
with the government was often difficult. This represented an obstacle 
to the implementation of projects leading to reducing the objectives of 
technical and administrative improvements. However, that is not to say 
that nothing was accomplished. We can note achievements dating back 
to the first Tunisian president Habib Bourguiba (1957–1987), and 
continued under Ben Ali. Among these achievements are the absence of 
restrictions on tourism – a major source of income (see Daher 2011), 
female emancipation and equality of women, family planning, the 
Assem Dandashly 
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prohibition of polygamy, facilitation of women’s access to divorce, and 
raising the marriage age for girls to 17 years.  
Another important reform concerns the independence of the 
judiciary from political influence. The judiciary, which has not been 
free since Tunisian independence in the mid-1950s and has been 
suffering from corruption, must be reformed to meet the demands of 
the people and the new era (interviews with members of the Tunisian 
Constituent Assembly, October 2013). EU attempts to support this were 
blocked by the previous regime. As part of its Support for Partnership, 
Reform and Inclusive Growth (SPRING) programme launched in 2011, 
the EU agreed (in October 2012) to provide an additional €25 million 
over the next four years, to be directly invested in judiciary reform. The 
focus is on technical and financial support of judicial institutions and 
management as well as on training judges and attorneys and 
broadening their knowledge of laws and regulations.  
Some EU member-states have also been involved in support to 
judicial reforms. Tunisian officials and NGOs representatives visited 
Poland in order to ‘study the Polish justice system and learn about the 
Polish transformation experience’ (Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
2012). Tunisia has also committed to adjust ‘its criminal and 
penitentiary legislation to become in line with international standards. 
That includes improving the working conditions of judges, the 
supervision of minors within the legal system and the terms in which 
someone can be detained’ (al-Arabiya News 3 October 2012). 
With regard to support to civil society, since the Barcelona process, 
the EU allocated parts of its financial support towards civil society 
organizations (CSOs). Unfortunately, the Tunisian regime blocked 
funding to most CSOs, and the EU was selective in its support, seeking 
to avoid dealing with Islamic groups. Islamic CSOs have remained 
active despite the regime’s oppression that limited their margin of 
movement. The EU veto on Islamic CSOs showed a lack of 
understanding of an important player in Tunisian society. The Ben Ali 
regime allowed very few Islamic groups to exist, while other 
organizations operated from abroad.  
During the reform period, EU civil society groups have been helping 
to develop their Tunisian counterparts. Member-state and especially 
CEEC civil society groups have become more involved lately in 
supporting their Tunisian counterparts. Poland, for example, has set up 
a programme to support Tunisian civil society and democratic 
transition within the framework of Support for Democracy 2012 in the 
form of foreign aid and training.6 The following projects were 
                                                          
6  Support for Democracy 2012 is a Solidarity Fund Poland programme funded by the 
Polish Foreign Aid Programme of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 
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implemented in 2012, aimed at not only developing the work of CSOs 
but also educating participants on the important role of an active 
citizenry and their relation to the state in a functioning democracy: 
‘Project I: Training programme for Tunisian youth non-governmental 
organizations (in cooperation with the Embassy of the Republic of 
Poland in Tunis); Project II: Study visit to Poland for Tunisian local 
leaders’ (Polska Fundacja Międzynarodowej Współpracy na Rzecz 
Rozwoju ‘Wiedzieć Jak’ 2012). These steps are necessary to equip these 
organizations with the basic skills needed to become active players in 
the bottom–up construction of a consolidated democratic system.  
In sum, we note positive developments regarding the adoption to EU 
norms and values. The democratic transition is moving forward, and 
Tunisia could become the first successful democratic case in the post-
Arab Spring era. 
5.2 Economic reforms 
There is a need to address the deteriorating economic situation in 
Tunisia: low growth, high unemployment rate, poverty, social 
inequality, as well as underdeveloped regions as a result of the 
previous regime’s policies and political marginalization. Economic 
support and development has been a priority area in agreements 
between the EU and its neighbours. However, much of the invested 
money has focused on certain fields that were of interest to previous 
regimes, not the current ones. This situation led to the existence of 
many marginalized regions in Tunisia (interview with a Tunisian civil 
society leader and journalist, October 2013).  Following the revolution, 
Tunisia has been seeking more EU support to address its socio-
economic problems and marginalized regions. And indeed, the EU 
approach to economic support has undergone some changes since the 
Ben Ali era. Importantly, the EU has agreed to provide more funding 
and assistance to develop the marginalized regions and deal with social 
and economic imbalances– for example, in 2011 the EU allocated €12 
million to reform the health system in the poorest regions (European 
Commission 2012b).  
Tunisia’s transitional government had already launched some 
programmes, including ‘a US$1.5 billion emergency plan to address 
unemployment and regional development, among a host of other 
concerns’ (World Bank 2012b). Despite the sums allocated for this 
programme, considerable external support is still needed, as well as 
‘structural reforms to create a dynamic private sector capable of 
producing the quality and quantity of jobs needed by Tunisia’s 
predominantly young population’ (World Bank 2012b).  
The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) 
and the International Finance Cooperation (IFC) have presented an 
Interim Strategy Note (ISN) for the fiscal year 2013/2014 to ‘support 
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the [Tunisian] authorities in the reforms necessary to promote private 
sector-led recovery and job creation, with a focus on openness, 
opportunity and accountability’ (World Bank 2012a). These reforms 
are necessary for sending a clear message that the business 
environment in Tunisia has changed towards greater transparency and 
is more welcoming to foreign businesses. This programme has already 
been launched, but will require further support to succeed. Various 
donors such as the World Bank Group, the IBRD, the IFC and the 
Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA) have facilitated its 
funding (World Bank 2012a). 
The Privileged Partnership (PP), concluded in November 2012, has 
come to emphasize some major articles highlighted in the Association 
Agreement and the Action Plan with Tunisia. The PP has pledged to 
increase financial and technical aid to Tunisia, in addition to opening 
Tunisian agricultural products to the Single Market, advancing 
industry and liberalizing the service sector. Liberalization of the service 
sector will facilitate European companies’ access to the Tunisian 
market, but there is no reciprocity involved. Tunisians still do not have 
free movement in Europe, and Tunisian companies have difficulties 
getting the necessary visas to access the EU (B’Chir  20 November 
2012; interviews with Tunisian senior officials and civil society 
activists, October 2011). Here it should also be noted that the EU has 
launched negotiations on a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade 
Agreement with Tunisia. 
At present, the EU, the World Bank and the European Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) as well as other international 
organizations and influential powers are focusing more on addressing 
the problems that led to the revolutions. Therefore, these actors are 
involved in or have promised financial support to certain projects 
intended to attract investments, create jobs, and increase growth. 
Based on consultations with the ‘emerging civil society’ on the 
priorities of the Tunisian economy, these players are working together 
to provide financial and technical assistance to support the efforts of 
the interim Tunisian government to create and implement reform 
programmes that can address the urgent needs of the country’s 
economy (World Bank 2012a). Creating a suitable environment for 
investment and facilitating the establishment of new businesses are 
important areas where Tunisia needs help. The EBRD will be investing 
in various economic projects, with the main focus on renewable 
energy. With this financial support, the EBRD will not only target the 
economy and growth, but will also share its experience regarding 
democratization and reforms of the market economy.  
Tunisia’s labour force is also in need of technical and financial 
support. The former government started a reform process in the mid-
1990s through the Mise à Niveau de la Formation et de l’Emploi 
(Manforme). The main objectives here have been to bridge the gap 
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between supply and demand, to promote flexible training capacity, to 
meet specific and changing skill requirements, and to support training 
centres to spread skills and know-how to the labour force in order to 
meet market demands (OECD 2008: 647). Another important area is 
reform of the educational system. Recognizing this as crucial to 
economic development, the EU has contributed since the beginning of 
the reform period to reform of the national education system at 
primary, secondary and higher levels, as well as in the field of 
vocational training, to promote achievement of the Millennium 
Development Goals. The integration process of human resources in the 
labour market has been initiated, but still represents a major challenge 
for Tunisia. 
The EU and other actors have been supporting economic 
development in Tunisia and other countries for a long time. This area 
has been the most advanced aspect of EU–Tunisia relations. Now we 
can see at least some changes in the allocation of economic support to 
address the urgent needs of the Tunisian economy: marginalized areas, 
unemployment and growth. Maintaining economic support is crucial to 
facilitate the work of the interim government regarding political 
reforms.  
In sum, we see that significant reforms are being implemented, with 
a focus on liberalizing the economy further and fostering economic 
development and growth. These steps allow Tunisia to have better 
access to the internal market, as well as moving the economy closer to 
adapting to EU norms.  
 
 6. Participation in EU policies 
As Tunisia was the first country to sign an Association Agreement,7 its 
participation in EU policies and negotiations has been more advanced 
than that of other countries. Meetings and cooperation between the two 
parties were developed even prior to the events of the Arab Spring 
events. In this section, I discuss the actors involved in Tunisia’s 
participation in EU policies in addition to the policies themselves.   
6.1 Active participation in meetings 
Meetings between Tunisia and the EU are frequent, and involve 
different actors at different levels. The highest political level is through 
the Association Council, which was established with the AA. The 
Association Council is the ministerial meeting that convenes on yearly 
basis and otherwise as necessary. It is composed of ‘the Council of the 
European Union and members of the Commission of the European 
Communities, on the one hand, and of members of the Government of 
the Republic of Tunisia, on the other’ (Article 79 of the Association 
Agreement). The chairmanship of the Association Council is held in 
turn between ‘a representative of the Presidency of the Council of the 
European Union and by a representative of the Government of the 
Republic of Tunisia’ (Article 82.3). All decisions are to be taken in 
agreement between the parties involved.  
The first meeting of the Association Council following the Tunisian 
revolution was held in Brussels on 19 November 2012, chaired by the 
Tunisian Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr Rafik Abdessalem. This 
meeting ‘provided an opportunity to seal a political agreement on the 
Privileged Partnership between Tunisia and the EU, as exemplified by 
the new Action Plan’ (EU Council 19 November 2012). The meeting 
built on the Tunisian proposal presented at the Eighth Association 
Council meeting in March 2010. Furthermore, the EU and Tunisia 
agreed to establish a Task Force to support Tunisia’s transition and 
better coordinate EU and international instruments. This Task Force is 
co-chaired by the High Representative and the Tunisian Prime Minister 
(European Commission 2011b). The joint Tunisia–EU Task Force held 
its first meeting on 28–29 September 2011 in Tunis. This offered an 
opportunity for the Tunisian authorities to give an orientation on their 
preparations for the presidential and parliamentary elections, in 
addition to the ‘economic and social development strategy for 2012–
                                                          
7  Tunisia signed its Association Agreement with the EU on 17 July 1995; this entered 
into force on 1 March 1998. 
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2016 (‘Jasmin Plan’), while underlining the short term challenges 
confronting the country’ (EEAS 2011). The meeting was attended by 
representatives of international organizations and third countries who 
‘expressed their support to the democratisation, development and 
reform process, and underlined that the success of this process would 
benefit both the stability and prosperity of Tunisia and that of the 
entire region’ (EEAS 2011). During this meeting, the EU and Tunisian 
authorities announced 30 September as the start of the Privileged 
Partnership negotiations. This step not only involved authorities at the 
executive level but also entailed ‘a step change in bilateral relations. It 
will strengthen political cooperation, in particular between the 
Tunisian Parliament and the European Parliament, boost the 
democratisation process and support progressive integration in the 
European Union's Internal Market, through a process of legislative and 
regulatory approximation in the spirit of the 2020 initiative’ (EEAS 
2011). 
With the Privileged Partnership (PP), the EU and Tunisia agreed on a 
new Action Plan that also brought the level of integration one step 
higher. The Action Plan offers ‘Tunisia a stake in the internal market and 
the possibility of participating progressively in key aspects of EU policies 
and programmes’ in addition to increasing Tunisian involvement in some 
Community meetings and discussion – mainly related to the issues 
highlighted in the Action Plan (EEAS 2013). The Action Plan also reflects a 
high level of involvement in the preparation, implementation and review 
phases. Both the EU and Tunisian authorities review the implementation of 
the Action Plan and ‘jointly amend and/or update the Action Plan on a 
regular basis to reflect progress in addressing the priorities’ (EEAS 2013). 
However, participation in negotiations is still limited to Tunisian 
officials and their EU counterparts. When it comes to implementation 
of some aspects of the agreements and discussing necessary practical 
measures that require the involvement of other actors – such as civil 
servants, or security force leaders – then there will be delegations 
representing the actors in question. The role of civil society is crucial to 
any functioning democracy, but this was long ignored in Tunisia. Not 
only were civil society groups banned from functioning freely, they 
were also were not included in any of the negotiations between the EU 
and Tunisia under Ben Ali. Even after the fall of Ben Ali, civil society 
has not been involved in the PP negotiating process, ‘although the 
issues at play in the partnership constitute part of their daily work with 
regards to the protection of human rights’ (FIDH 3 December 2013). 
This neglect of the importance of Tunisian civil society in EU–Tunisia 
relations moved civil society actors to call for their inclusion in the 
talks and the reform process, in addition to being ‘recognised and 
involved as a full-fledged partner in identifying priorities and assessing 
policies implemented in the framework of EU–Tunisia relations’ (Euro–
Mediterranean Human Rights Network 2013). 
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Pressure from civil society actors succeeded in pushing the Tunisian 
government and the EU to agree on including civil society groups in the 
PP implementation process in addition to the ‘follow-up and 
assessment of the privileged Partnership’s Action Plan’ (Euro–
Mediterranean Human Rights Network 2013). 
6.2 Participation in some policies  
The EU–Tunisia agreements cover wide range of policies (including 
R&D, healthcare, the environment, energy, infrastructure and civil 
society). Tunisia is involved in many programmes with its EU 
counterparts, with a high level of integration and cooperation. Our 
focus here will be on trade relations and security issues. 
6.2.1 Trade and access to the Internal Market 
In economic terms, 8 the EU is considered Tunisia’s primary trading 
partner. Access to the market has increased over the years, leading to 
deeper integration. With the exception of the small slowdown in 2009 
due to the euro crisis, trade relations between the EU and Tunisia have 
been increasing since the 2003 (see Figure 1). In 2012, total trade 
between the EU and Tunisia amounted to €20.6 billion, or 
approximately 55.9 per cent of all Tunisian trade (European 
Commission 2013a). Here the EU absorbs 74.1 per cent of Tunisia’s 
exports, while 66.9 per cent of the country’s imports come from the EU 
(European Commission 2012a).  
                                                          
8  Within the framework of the Barcelona Process, Tunisia was among the major 
beneficiaries from the Mesures d’accompagnement (MEDA) Programme (both MEDA 
I and MEDA II; 1995-2006) with an annual average commitment reaching around 
€80 million. With the ENP, the cooperation was strengthened and the National 
Indicative Programme (NIP) for the period 2007–2010 allocated €300 million for 
three main areas: economic governance, competitiveness, and convergence with 
the EU; human resources and improvements in employability; and sustainable 
development. The NIP for 2011–2013 has a budget of €240 million that focuses on 
the social (employment), economic (mainly developing enterprises), and the 
governance sectors (mainly judicial system). 
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Figure 1 EU Trade Flows and Balance with Tunisia 
 
 
Source: European Commission, 2013b, p. 3. 
In 2008, Tunisia was the first Mediterranean country to remove tariffs 
for industrial products, thus entering into a free trade area with the EU. 
Tunisia has become the EU’s 31st largest trading partner (European 
Commission 2010). Furthermore, on 14 December 2011, ‘the Council 
adopted negotiating directives for Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade 
Agreements (DCFTAs) with Egypt, Jordan, Morocco and Tunisia’ 
(European Commission 2013a). A DCFTA with Tunisia will support the 
country’s efforts to reform the economy, in addition to creating an 
investment-friendly climate. It will move ‘beyond the scope of the 
existing Association Agreement to include trade in services, 
government procurement, competition, intellectual property rights, 
and investment protection. Overall, it could lead to a gradual 
integration of Tunisia’s economy into the EU single market. The main 
objective of the DCFTA is to bring Tunisian legislation closer to EU 
legislation in trade-related areas’ (European Commission 2013a). 
6.2.2 Cooperation on security issues 
EU–Tunisian cooperation in issues related to the Common Security and 
Defence Policy in addition to Justice and Home Affairs has been 
developing since the Barcelona Process. Both parties ‘have undertaken 
to strengthen their cooperation in the field of migration and asylum’ 
(EU Council 2013). The EU and Tunisia have concluded a Mobility 
Partnership, still awaiting signature. This Mobility Partnership will 
mean enhanced cooperation on refugees, asylum and migration issues. 
In order to strengthen border control, the European External Action 
Service (EEAS) recommended that one should ‘use the opportunities 
provided under the ongoing peer reviews on border management and 
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security sector reform to engage with the Tunisian authorities’ (EU 
Council 19 November 2013).  
Cooperation on fighting organized crime and trafficking is very 
active. Furthermore, the EU Mediterranean member-states and North 
Africa’s Tunisia, Algeria and Egypt are planning to establish the 
Seahorse Mediterranean network by 2015. This network will allow the 
involved states ‘to directly exchange factual information on incidents 
and patrols with each other in near-real time via satellite 
communication’ (European Commission 4 December 2013). Regarding 
the refugee situation, Tunisia is involved in , inter alia,  the Regional 
Protection Programmes (RPPs), aimed at improving the ‘situation of the 
refugees at the local level’ (European Commission 4 December 2013).   
Most of these issues are highlighted in the Action Plan in greater 
detail in the section on Justice and Home Affairs and under ‘Regional 
and international issues, cooperation on external relations and security 
questions, conflict prevention and crisis management’ (EEAS 2013).
 7. Attractiveness of the EU 
Despite its blunt support to the Ben Ali regime, the EU is still viewed 
positively in Tunisia, and Tunisians see the EU as a legitimate actor in 
the region (interviews with various members of the Tunisian 
Constituent Assembly and government officials, October 2013). The EU 
is perceived more positively than other players in Tunisia due to its 
credibility (based on its soft power) and its historic relations with the 
region. Here it is important to distinguish between the EU and its 
individual member-states. For example, Tunisian have not forgotten 
the when the French Defence Minister Michelle Alliot-Marie offered Ben 
Ali support to suppress the revolution. This created tensions with 
France, but not with the EU (interviews with Tunisian officials, October 
2013). That said, trade relations and cooperation with France 
continued: France has strong trade relations and investments in 
Tunisia.  
Support for EU economic development, trade and human rights is 
very high in Tunisia –87, 83 and 76 per cent, respectively, in 2012  
(ENPI 2013). The ENPI survey, conducted in November–December 
2012, found that ‘77% of Tunisians feel the EU is an important partner, 
with 64% believing the EU and Tunisia share sufficient common values 
to be able to cooperate – significantly higher than the average for the 
ENPI South region (46% and 43% respectively)’ (ENPI 2013). 
Moreover, as one official highlighted in an interview in October 2013, 
the EU does not face competition from other international actors in 
Tunisia.  
Despite the Qatari support to Tunisia during and after the 
revolution, there is no competition with the EU. Unlike the case in 
Morocco, where Saudi Arabia has good relations and many 
investments, Tunisia’s relations between Saudi Arabia are not as 
developed, and they deteriorated when Saudi Arabia provided Ben Ali 
with political asylum. The United Arab Emirates (UAE) welcomed the 
change in Tunisia and offered financial support; however, relations 
worsened after differences of opinion between Tunisia and the UAE on 
Egypt’s military coup in 2013. Following the speech given by the 
Tunisian president at the United Nations, in which he criticized the 
2013 military coup in Egypt, UAE recalled its ambassador from Tunisia 
(PressTV  28 September 2013). 
The geographical closeness, historical relations and close ties 
between Tunisia and the EU are unique. These ties, strengthened in 
agreements that date back to March 1969 and cover a wide range of 
policies and areas, have been developing and strengthening since then.  
 8. Conclusions 
This contribution has examined the extent to which Tunisia can be 
seen as an integrated part of the EU security community. It has 
analysed the strength of Tunisian integration according to three 
dimensions of integration: scope of the agreements, level of 
adaptation, and the level of participation. In all three areas we found 
strong levels of cooperation and integration. The scope of the 
agreements is very thorough and comprehensive; indeed, most articles 
in the Action Plan are identical with chapters of the acquis. The level of 
adapting to EU rules of norms and complying with EU values varies, 
but is especially high in areas like cooperation in justice and home 
affairs, regional policies, regional cooperation on common security 
threats and issues (border control, anti-terrorism, countering illegal 
migration), in addition to trade relations. Also the level of participation 
is very advanced between Tunisia and the EU. Tunisian authorities 
participate in EU meetings at various levels, and Tunisians are working 
together with the EU as regards a wide range of policies. Moreover, in 
comparison to the EU’s relations with the eastern ENP countries, it 
seems that southern ENP countries (Tunisia in particular) are more 
involved in the drafting of the agreements and policies. Therefore, we 
may say that Tunisia is strongly integrated in the EU security 
community. 
How attractive, then, does Tunisia find the EU, also in comparison 
to other international and regional players? My interviews conducted in 
Tunisia in October 2013 clearly indicate the EU is not facing any threat 
to its position in Tunisia from any other actor: it is still the main 
security and economic player not only in Tunisia but also in the MENA 
(Bremberg and Rieker 2014). The EU is still the most attractive actor 
and the most accepted by both Tunisian elites and the general 
population.  
Following the Arab Spring, the process of security- building that the 
EU had been developing along with authoritarian regimes in the MENA 
seemed threatened. Today, with the Dignity Revolution in Tunisia and 
the new reality highlighting the people’s quest for democracy, the EU 
seems to have realized that it cannot continue to ignore democratic 
reforms. Democracy areas in action plans, once by-passed, are now 
getting more attention. The EU has increased its support and is 
focusing on areas that were ignored either by domestic authorities or by 
the EU for decades, due to fears of the rise of Islamists, security threats 
and increased immigration to the EU.  
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Tunisia offers a real test case for the reformed ENP. It presents a 
window of opportunity for the EU to promote and support democratic 
transition and consolidation in the region. Without a functioning 
economy and reformed institutions capable of creating jobs and 
addressing the demands of the people, there is no hope for democracy 
to prosper and for stability and security to be maintained in Tunisia. 
The Privileged Partnership has doubled EU economic aid to various 
economic sectors (regional development, economic growth, 
employment, etc.) in addition to planning access to the European 
market. Economic development is important for dealing with the 
problems inherited from the Ben Ali era and led to the revolution, and 
for ensuing stability. It is also a necessary condition for democratic 
transition and consolidation.  
The EU has stepped up its support for further political and 
institutional reforms intended to promote more political participation 
and rights, good governance and accountability – reforms that were 
blocked by the Ben Ali regime. Also the judiciary is receiving its share 
of reform. EU support to civil society groups was not significant in the 
pre-Arab Spring era, whether due to the religious ideology of some of 
those groups or because the regimes blocked the funding. Following 
the Arab Spring, the EU and its member-states have also increased 
financial and technical aid for civil society groups, and have called on 
the new government to return to such groups the funds frozen by the 
Ben Ali regime.  
The EU has increased its support in several economic and political 
areas, while keeping an eye on security and stability. The EU avoidance 
of using negative conditionality and sanctions in its relations with 
Tunisia and the neighbours makes it a typical liberal/civilian actor that 
uses economic incentives to push the targeted country to comply with 
rules and norms. This reality has not changed with events of the Arab 
Spring. The EU attitude regarding the promotion of democracy beyond 
its borders still operates within the framework of the ENP, using the 
same old tools to address a new situation. With the regime change in 
Tunisia, the EU pushed for the Privileged Partnership, equivalent to the 
advanced status that both Morocco and Jordan have enjoyed since 
2008 – despite the lack of democratic reforms. 
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 Appendix 
Table 1 Comparison between the Accession Chapters and the Action Plan with 
Tunisia 
 
Enlargement Chapters Action Plan with Tunisia 
Chapter 1: Free movement 
of goods  
Movement of Goods: 
Trade relations 
Customs 
Technical rules, conformity evaluation 
standards and procedures (EU harmonised 
sector) 
Elimination of restrictions, streamlined 
administration (non-harmonized EU areas) 
Chapter 2: Freedom of 
movement for workers  
Movement of persons, particularly workers, 
and coordination of social security systems 
Chapter 3: Right of 
establishment and freedom 
to provide services  
Right of Establishment, company law and 
services: 
Right of establishment and company law 
Services 
Financial services 
Chapter 4: Free movement 
of capital  
Capital movements and current payments 
Chapter 5: Public 
procurement  
Public procurement 
Chapter 6: Company law  Right of Establishment, company law and 
services: 
Company law 
 
Chapter 7: Intellectual 
property law  
Intellectual and industrial property rights 
Chapter 8: Competition 
policy  
Competition Policy 
State monopolies 
State aid 
Chapter 9: Financial 
services  
Financial control 
Chapter 10: Information 
society and media  
Information society 
Chapter 11: Agriculture and 
rural development  
Economic and social reform and development: 
Regional Development 
Sustainable Development 
Chapter 12: Food safety, 
veterinary and 
phytosanitary policy  
Health and plant health issues 
Chapter 13: Fisheries  NA 
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Chapter 14: Transport policy  Transport 
Chapter 15: Energy  Energy 
Chapter 16: Taxation  Taxation 
Chapter 17: Economic and 
monetary policy  
As joining Economic and Monetary Union is not 
applicable, however the Action Plans focus on: 
Economic and social reform and development: 
Macroeconomic framework 
Structural reform and progress toward a 
functioning and competitive market economy 
Chapter 18: Statistics  Statistics 
Chapter 19: Social policy 
and employment  
Political Dialogue and Reform:  
Fundamental Social rights and core labour 
standards 
Economic and social reform and development: 
Cooperation on social policy and employment 
Chapter 20: Enterprise and 
industrial policy  
Enterprise Policy 
Intellectual and industrial property rights 
Chapter 21: Trans-European 
networks  
NA 
Chapter 22: Regional policy 
and coordination of 
structural instruments  
Political Dialogue and Reform:  
Regional and international issues, cooperation 
on external relations and security questions, 
conflict prevention and crisis management 
Regional cooperation and initiative 
Chapter 23: Judiciary and 
fundamental rights  
Chapter 24: Justice, freedom 
and security 
Political Dialogue and Reforms: 
Democracy and the rule of law 
Respect for human rights and fundamental 
freedoms 
Cooperation on Justice and home affairs 
Migration (legal and illegal, re-admission, 
visas, asylum) 
Border management 
Combating organised crime (including the 
smuggling of migrants and trafficking of 
human beings) 
Drugs 
Money laundering, economic and financial 
crimes 
Judicial and police cooperation 
 Chapter 25: Science and 
research  
Science and technology, research and 
development 
 Chapter 26: Education and 
culture  
People-to-people contacts: 
Education, Training and Youth 
Cultural Cooperation 
Chapter 27: Environment  Environment 
Chapter 28: Consumer and 
health protection  
Public Health 
Chapter 29: Customs union  NA 
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Chapter 30: External 
relations  
Chapter 31: Foreign, 
security and defence policy  
Regional and international issues, cooperation 
on external relations and security questions, 
conflict prevention and crisis management 
Chapter 32: Financial 
control 
NA 
 
Chapter 33: Financial and 
budgetary provisions 
NA 
Chapter 34 – Institutions  NA 
Chapter 35 – Other issues NA 
NA Civil society cooperation 
NA Cultural cooperation 
 
Source: Personal compilation (2013) from the European Commission (n.d.) 
website on Enlargement and European Union External Action  
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